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Summary
Objectives: To quantify the likelihood that 
a shared truck used to ship pigs will be con-
taminated with porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome (PRRS) virus at the 
end of a given day, and to evaluate the ef-
icacy of cleaning and washing protocols for 
trucks, using a Bayesian approach.
Materials and methods: PRRS virus-in-
fected farms, from which trucks had shipped 
pigs, were deemed to be the source of con-
tamination. A quantitative stochastic model 
was built using farm- and animal-level PRRS 
prevalence data, the number of times a truck 
is typically shared on any given day, shipment 
size, travel time between farms, and the ei-
cacy of three diferent cleaning and disinfec-
tion procedures.
Results: he model predicted a median prob-
ability of 0.525 that a truck would be contam-
inated at the end of any given day, without 
considering the number of previous ship-
ments made by that truck or whether or not 
it had been washed and disinfected between 
shipments. Truck washing alone resulted in a 
negligible decrease in probability that a truck 
would be contaminated, while washing and 
disinfection followed by drying had the high-
est impact, with a greater than 99% reduction 
in probability of contamination. 
Implications: Findings of this study suggest 
that under current biosecurity practices, a 
substantial risk exists for the spread of PRRS 
virus due to truck sharing. his model could 
also be utilized in understanding the risk of 
truck sharing on the spread of other swine 
diseases (such as porcine epidemic diarrhea) 
where transportation is believed to spread 
the virus. 
Keywords: swine, Bayesian, porcine repro-
ductive and respiratory syndrome virus, 
truck sharing, shipment
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Resumen - Modelando la contaminación 
de camiones utilizados en el embarque 
de cerdos infectados con el virus del sín-
drome reproductivo y respiratorio porcino
Objetivos: Cuantiicar la probabilidad de 
que un camión compartido, utilizado  para 
embarcar cerdos ese contamine con el virus 
del síndrome reproductivo y respiratorio 
porcino (PRRS) al inal del día, y evaluar la 
eicacia de los protocolos de lavado y limpie-
za de camiones, utilizando un acercamiento 
Bayesiano.
Materials y métodos: Se consideró que las 
granjas infectadas con el virus del PRRS, de 
las cuales los camiones habían embarcado 
cerdos, eran la fuente de la contaminación. Se 
construyó un modelo estocástico cuantitativo 
utilizando datos de la prevalencia del PRRS 
a nivel animal y de granja, el número de veces 
que un camión se comparte típicamente en un 
día, el tamaño del embarque, tiempo del viaje 
entre granjas, y la eicacia de tres procedimien-
tos diferentes de limpieza y desinfección.
Resultados: El modelo predijo una probabi-
lidad mediana de 0.525 para que un camión 
se contamine al inal de un día dado, sin 
considerar el número de embarques previos 
hechos por el camión o si se había o no 
lavado y desinfectado entre embarques. El 
sólo lavado del camión resultó en una dis-
minución insigniicante en la probabilidad 
de que un camión se contaminara, mientras 
que el lavado y la desinfección seguidos de 
secado, tuvieron el impacto más alto, con 
una reducción mayor al 99% en la probabili-
dad de contaminación.  
Implicaciones: Los hallazgos de este estudio 
sugieren que bajo las prácticas actuales de bi-
oseguridad, existe un riesgo substancial para 
la propagación del virus del PRRS debido al 
hecho de compartir el camión. Este modelo, 
también podría ser utilizado, para entender 
el riesgo de compartir camiones en la propa-
gación de otras enfermedades porcinas (tales 
como la diarrea epidémica porcina) donde se 
cree que el transporte propaga el virus.
Résumé - Modélisation de la contamina-
tion des camions utilisés dans le transport 
de porcs infectés par le virus du syndrome 
reproducteur et respiratoire porcin
Objectifs: Quantiier la possibilité qu’un 
camion partagé utilisé pour le transport de 
porcs sera contaminé par le virus du syn-
drome reproducteur et respiratoire porcin 
(SRRP) à la in d’une journée donnée, et 
évaluer l’eicacité des protocoles de nettoy-
age et de désinfection des camions, par une 
approche bayésienne.
Matériels et méthodes: Les fermes infec-
tées par le virus du SRRP à partir desquelles 
des camions furent utilisés pour expédier 
des porcs étaient considérées comme étant 
la source de la contamination. Un modèle 
stochastique quantitatif a été construit 
en utilisant les données de prévalence du 
SRRP au niveau de la ferme et au niveau des 
animaux, le nombre de fois typique qu’un 
camion était partagé à chaque jour, la taille 
de l’expédition, le temps de transit entre les 
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Porcine reproductive and respira-tory syndrome (PRRS) is a major viral disease of swine with devastat-
ing economic consequences to the swine 
industry.1,2 Pigs of all ages are susceptible 
to PRRS virus, with highly variable clini-
cal manifestations in diferent age groups 
of infected pigs, ranging from abortion, 
anorexia, and pyrexia in pregnant sows to 
respiratory signs, high mortality, and poor 
growth in young pigs.3 Several direct and 
indirect mechanisms have been identiied 
for the spread of PRRS virus from one farm 
to another. Direct contact routes include 
movement of infected animals and use of 
contaminated semen. Indirect mechanisms 
involve sharing shipment trucks between 
farms4,5 and sharing of equipment and 
other fomites.6-8 Aerosol transmission has 
also been reported,9,10 and some studies 
have implicated the role of insects, such as 
mosquitoes and house lies, in mechanical 
transmission of the virus.11,12
he swine industry in North America has 
become increasingly specialized and in-
tegrated, with the adoption of three-site 
production systems that require regular 
movement of pigs between sites.13 Canadian 
swine producers and experts in the swine 
industry have been concerned about the role 
of shared trucks in the farm-to-farm spread 
of PRRS virus.14 In recent years, network 
analysis has elucidated contact patterns 
among animal holdings in speciic livestock 
industries.15-18 A number of recent swine 
movement analysis studies in Denmark 
and France have identiied the importance 
of shipment vehicles as a means to spread 
infectious agents between farms that are 
otherwise not directly connected.17,19,20 In 
a recent study characterizing swine move-
ment in four Canadian regions,18 patterns 
of truck-sharing between farms, similar to 
those described in the United Kingdom,17 
France,20 and Denmark,19 were identiied, 
with one truck, on average, being shared 
among four diferent farms. Similarly, for 
more than 50% of all shipments on any par-
ticular day, the same truck had been used in 
at least one additional shipment from a dif-
ferent farm.18 hus, any inadequate cleaning 
and disinfection of vehicles is likely to in-
crease the risk of spread of infectious agents, 
as has been implicated in the recent spread 
of porcine epidemic diarrhea (PED) virus 
across North America.21
he role of shipment vehicles in the spread 
of PRRS virus to susceptible pigs has also 
been demonstrated through experimental 
studies in which sentinel pigs became in-
fected ater being housed in an artiicially 
contaminated trailer and in trailers that 
housed experimentally infected pigs.4 Simi-
larly, mechanical transmission of PRRS virus 
via transportation during cold and warm 
weather has been documented by the same 
authors.22,23 Trucks contaminated with 
PRRS virus require rigorous cleaning, disin-
fection, and drying to eliminate the virus.4,24 
he Canadian Swine Health Board has de-
veloped protocols to wash, disinfect, and dry 
such transport vehicles.25 However, anec-
dotal evidence indicates a lack of consistency 
in the application of these standardized 
protocols, with some trucks being cleaned 
by washing only, while others are washed 
and disinfected, and others undergo the 
full protocol of washing, disinfection, and 
overnight drying. In these experiments, Dee 
et al4 also evaluated cleaning and disinfec-
tion protocols. PRRS virus from the trailers 
was detected in all combinations of cleaning 
and disinfection treatments except when 
bedding removal, washing, disinfecting, 
and drying were combined. Washing and 
fumigation with glutaraldehyde-quaternary 
ammonium chloride or washing and disin-
fection plus overnight drying were efective 
treatments.24
A Bayesian approach was selected for this 
study, as it supports a combination of difer-
ent sources of information and the propaga-
tion of uncertainty in the model.26 It also 
allows the assumption of conditional depen-
dence between nodes required by classical 
risk assessment to be relaxed, supporting the 
estimation of joint probability distributions 
at nodes that are conditionally independent, 
through the use of Bayesian networks.27 A 
Bayesian network is a probabilistic graphical 
model representing a network of nodes con-
nected by directed links, where nodes repre-
sent a set of random variables, and the links, 
dependencies between these nodes. Bayesian 
networks have been used in veterinary epi-
demiology to aid in disease diagnosis28-30 
or to study associations between biosecurity 
practices and disease outbreak.31,32 
he objectives of the analyses described here 
were to use a Bayesian approach to quantify 
the likelihood that a truck used for a ship-
ment of pigs would be contaminated with 
PRRS virus at the end of any given day (as 
well as on subsequent days), and to evalu-
ate the eicacy of cleaning and disinfection 
protocols in eliminating the virus from these 
trucks. he model estimates the probabil-
ity that a truck will be contaminated with 
PRRS virus ater it has been used by a num-
ber of farms on any given day, and provides 
estimates on the likelihood that the truck 
will remain contaminated on subsequent 
days. In addition, it provides insights into 
the likelihood that the PRRS virus will be 
eliminated from the trucks ater one of a 
number of cleaning and disinfection proto-
cols has been applied.
Materials and methods
Truck-use pattern for transportation of pigs 
between swine farms, informed by pig trace-
ability data from a pilot study in Canada,18 
suggests that a given truck may be used by 
two or more farms on any given day, and 
may or may not be cleaned between ship-
ments. A schematic representation of the 
Bayesian model is presented in Figure 1. 
he baseline model estimates the prob-
ability that a truck “i” will be contaminated 
with PRRS virus at the end of Day 1, given 
it visited “j” farms on that day, and that at 
least one of those farms was infected with 
PRRS virus. It also estimates whether the 
truck had suicient viral load to make it 
infectious, which is determined by the travel 
time of the truck during the shipment, the 
number of pigs in the shipment (ie, ship-
ment size), the animal-level prevalence of 
the virus, and the probability of animals 
fermes, et l’eicacité de trois procédures dif-
férentes de nettoyage et désinfection.
Résultats: Le modèle a prédit une proba-
bilité médiane de 0,525 qu’un camion serait 
contaminé à la in d’une journée, sans pren-
dre en considération le nombre de transports 
précédents efectués par ce camion ou s’il 
avait été ou non lavé et désinfecté entre les 
transports. Uniquement un lavage du ca-
mion a entrainé une diminution négligeable 
de la probabilité qu’un camion serait con-
taminé, alors que le lavage et la désinfection 
suivis par un séchage avaient le plus grand 
impact avec une réduction de plus de 99% de 
la probabilité de contamination.
Implications: Les résultats de cette étude 
suggèrent qu’en fonction des pratiques de 
biosécurité actuelles, un risque substantiel 
existe pour la dissémination du virus du 
SRRP dû au partage de camions. Ce modèle 
pourrait également être utilisé pour com-
prendre le risque de partage de camions dans 
la dissémination d’autres maladies porcines 
(telle que la diarrhée épidémique porcine) 
pour lesquelles le transport est considéré 
comme pouvant disséminer le virus.
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shedding in the shipment group. he prob-
ability of shedding animals depends on the 
production type “k” of the infected farm.
he baseline model incorporated one of the 
three “l” cleaning and disinfection protocols 
and evaluated the eicacy of each of these 
protocols in eliminating the PRRS virus from 
contaminated trucks. his risk assessment 
considered the following ive nodes as inlu-
encing the probability that a truck would be 
contaminated with PRRS virus at the end of 
a given day: farm-level prevalence of PRRS 
virus (proportion of PRRS farms with at least 
one PRRS-positive animal), number of farms 
using the same truck on that day, number of 
animals shipped on the truck, animal-level 
prevalence of PRRS virus in the group of 
shipped pigs, and proportion of animals 
shedding the virus in the group, which in 
turn depends on the stage of growth of the 
pigs and the time of travel between two 
farms. A detailed description of the nodes is 
presented in Table 1, with a summary of the 
underlying assumptions, process models, and 
associated input values. Finally, we estimated 
the probability that a truck “i” would be 
contaminated with PRRS virus by multiply-
ing the probability that at least one of the 
farms “j” that it had visited was infected 
with PRRS virus, the probability that the 
truck had more animals in that shipment 
than Minani k (minimum number of animals 
required on a truck to have enough infec-
tious animals to contaminate the truck), and 
the probability that the travel time was more 
than 2 hours.
Data description
Data used in this study were obtained from 
the literature4,24 and from a pilot pig trace-
'JHVSF Schematic representation of the Bayesian network used to estimate the likelihood that shipment trucks would be con-
taminated with porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) virus and to evaluate the eicacy of various cleaning and 
disinfecting protocols for removal of PRRS virus from contaminated trucks. Fixed nodes are shown in rectangles, with stochastic 
nodes in ellipsoids. he diamond-shaped node represents an outcome that is estimated by the model. Nodes in yellow represent 
prior information. he model represents a trucki, that can have visitsj (two, three, four, or more) on a day and can ship animals from 
production typesk (farrowing, nursery, or inishing) of swine farms and can be cleaned by using protocolsl (wash; wash and disinfect; 
or wash, disinfect, and dry).
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N
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1
ability study carried out in four Canadian 
regions and described elsewhere.18 As the 
Bayesian approach is useful in combining 
information from several sources, and since 
most of the data used in the study are based 
on published literature or experts’ judge-
ment, we considered these data as prior in-
formation for the model.
For this study, we assumed that a truck was 
free of PRRS virus when it was used for the 
irst time on Day 1. In assessment of the per-
petuation of risk on Day 2 and subsequent 
days, we did not consider any new sources of 
infection for that truck, such that all farms 
visited by the truck ater the irst day were 
assumed to be clean. On the basis of the 
experts’ judgment, we assumed the farm-
level prevalence (F prev) of PRRS virus to 
be 50%. One co-author (DH, professor of 
swine health management) and an external 
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5BCMF List of nodes and parameters, process models, prior distributions, and observed data with source and references used 
to estimate the probability that a truck will be contaminated with porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) 
at the end of a working day
/PEFTBOE 
QBSBNFUFST /PUBUJPO %F dOJUJPO
1SPDFTTNPEFMBOE
FRVBUJPO %BUBQSJPST 3FGFSFODF
Truck use Tr use Probability that the truck is used 
between two, three, or four, or more 
farms in a single day
NA Two = 0.49 
hree = 0.19 
≥ Four = 0.32
Pilot Pig  
Traceability Data18
Farm positives F Pos 2 No. of farms infected with PRRSV of  
the two farms visited by the truck
Binomial NA Assumption of 50%  
farm level prevalence  
(F Prev) of PRRSV
F Pos 3 No. of farms infected with PRRSV of  
the three farms visited by the truck
Binomial NA
F Pos 4 No. of farms infected with PRRSV of 
the four farms visited by the truck
Binomial NA
Farm infection F inf 2 /3 /4 Probability that at least one of the farms 
was infected when the truck was used by 
two, three, or four farms
1-(1-F prev)^F Pos NA
Comb prob Probability that at least one farm the 
truck visited was infected, when the 
number of farms it visited was unknown
F inf 2*0.49 + F inf 
3*.19 + F inf 4*.32
NA
Animal level 
prevalence
A prevk Prevalence of PRRSV in the batch  
of animals shipped
NA Fixed: 0.8 Experts’ judgment
Shedding 
animals
Shed anik Probability of shedding animals  
in a batch of animals shipped
NA Fixed: 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 For farrowing, nursery and 
inishing farms, based on 
experts’ judgment
Shedding 
prevalence
Shed prevk Probability of infectious and shedding 
animals in a batch of animals shipped
A prev * Shed ani NA NA
No. of  
shedding 
animals
Nanik No. of infectious and shedding animals 
on a truck to characterize  
it as contaminated
NA Fixed = 2 Dee et al study4
Minimum  no. 
of animals
Minanik Minimum no. of animals required on a 
truck to have at least two infectious and 
shedding animals in a batch of animals 
shipped (based on shedding prevalence)
Hypergeometric 
N ani fa~dhyper (Min 
ani fa, m fa, N fa, 1)
NA NA
Nani1k No. of infectious and shedding animals 
on a truck when the no. of animals on the 
truck is equal to Minani
Hypergeometric 
N ani nu~dhyper (Min 
ani nu, m nu, N nu, 1)
NA NA
Nani1 stepk Probability that a truck with Minani has at 
least two infectious and shedding animals
N ani i~dhyper (Min 
ani i, m i, N i, 1)
NA NA
Shipment size Shipsizek he distribution of shipment  
size for shipments from the  
three production types
Triangular ()† For farrowing farms 
(min, max): 10,350; 
nursery farms: 
12,700, inishing 
farms: 6300
Pilot Pig  
Traceability Data18
Min shipment 
size
MinshipFa/Nu/Fi Probability that the truck has more animals 
than Minani if it was coming from  
a farrowing/nursery/inishing farm
Step (Shipsizek-Minanik )* 
Nani1 stepk
NA NA
Travel time Travel time Distribution of travel time for trucks, 
obtained by assuming a triangular 
distribution for travel time with min and 
max values of 0.5 and 6, respectively
Triangular ()‡ Mini = 0.5 
Max = 6
Experts’  
judgment
Travel Travel Probability that travel time was more 
than 2 hours in order to qualify the  
truck as infective
Step (travel time-2) NA NA
Infective dose Inf dose Probability that the truck has an infective 
dose of virus: depends on shipment  
size and travel time
Travel* minship NA NA
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5BCMF Continued
/PEFTBOE 
QBSBNFUFST /PUBUJPO %F dOJUJPO
1SPDFTTNPEFMBOE
FRVBUJPO %BUBQSJPST 3FGFSFODF
Truck  
infection
Tr inf Probability that the truck is 
contaminated at the end  
of the day’s work
Tr use*F inf * Inf dose NA NA
Truck wash 
eicacy
W eicacy Probability that washing  
clears the virus  
from the truck 
Binomial  
(N W prot,  
W eicacy ) 
N prot§ = 0 
N w¶ = 20 Wd 
eicacy ~ beta 
(0.5,0.5)§§
For values,  
Dee et al4,24
Truck  
wash and  
disinfection 
eicacy
Wd eicacy Probability that washing  
and disinfection clears the  
virus from the truck 
Binomial  
(N wd, Wd eicacy)
N prot§ = 6 
N wd†† = 10 Wd 
eicacy ~ beta 
(0.5,0.5)§§
Truck wash, 
disinfection, 
and dry  
eicacy
Wdd eicacy Probability that washing,  
disinfection, and drying  
clears the virus from  
the truck 
Binomial  
(N wdd, Wd eicacy )
N prot§ = 10 
N wdd‡‡ = 10 
Wdd eicacy ~ 
beta (0.5,0.5)§§
Truck  
infection  
ater wdd
Tr inf wdd Probability that the truck is still 
contaminated ater washing, washing, 
and disinfection and washing, and 
disinfection and drying
Tr inf * W eicacy NA NA
†  For shipment size a triangular distribution was simulated using two uniform distributions [Uniform (min/2, max/2) + Uniform (min/2, max/2)] 
in OpenBUGS with minimum and maximum as 5th and 95th percentiles of shipment size.
‡  For travel time, a triangular distribution was simulated using two uniform distributions [Uniform (min/2, max/2) + Uniform (min/2, max/2)].
§  N prot = No. of clean trucks ater wash, wash and disinfection, or wash, disinfection, and dry.
¶  N w = Total no. of trucks washed.
††  N wd = Total no. of trucks washed and disinfected.
‡‡  N wdd = Total no. of trucks washed, disinfected, and dried.
§§  Jefreys priors.
NA = not applicable.
 
expert (Dr Zvonimir Poljak, an associate 
professor of veterinary epidemiology with a 
research focus on swine diseases), who have 
extensive expertise in swine production and 
management across Canada, provided input 
to estimate some of the parameter values. Us-
ing the farm-level prevalence of the virus, we 
estimated the number of farms that might be 
infected with PRRS virus (of the farms visited 
by the truck on any day), as well as the prob-
ability that at least one of the visited farms 
was infected with PRRS virus. A detailed 
description of the estimation procedure for 
the values and parameters of each node is pro-
vided in the supplementary material.
Models
Two sets of models were evaluated to esti-
mate the likelihood that the trucks shared 
between farms for the shipment of pigs 
were contaminated with PRRS virus. First, 
a baseline model was simulated that did not 
involve any cleaning or disinfection protocol 
being applied to the truck, which resulted in 
an estimation of the “baseline” probability 
that the truck would be contaminated at the 
end of Day 1. he baseline model was then 
extended to incorporate decay of the virus 
over time under two diferent seasonal set-
tings: warmer months (assuming an ambient 
temperature of approximately 22°C) and 
colder months (which assumed an ambient 
temperature of approximately 4°C or less) to 
assess the probability that the truck would 
remain contaminated on subsequent days 
under these conditions. 
Evaluation of cleaning and disinfec-
tion protocols
he baseline model was extended to include 
three cleaning and disinfection protocols that 
have been assessed previously in terms of their 
efectiveness in eliminating the PRRS virus 
from contaminated trucks. Data from Dee et 
al studies4,24 (summarised in Table 1) were 
used for each of the three cleaning protocols 
to assess their efectiveness in reducing the 
probability that a truck used for shipments 
of pigs would remain contaminated with 
PRRS virus. Since these data are from a 
small number of replication experiments, 
non-informative Jefreys priors were used. 
As these priors depend upon the process 
model33 for these nodes, beta (0.5, 0.5) was 
used in order to avoid a large inluence of 
these data on the posterior estimates.
Scenarios
A total of 21 scenarios were constructed 
and analysed (Table 2). A subset of 12 of 
those scenarios did not include any cleaning 
or disinfection control measures, while the 
other nine scenarios evaluated the eicacy of 
each of the three cleaning and disinfection 
protocols. For scenarios without cleaning 
and disinfection protocols, the risks for 
trucks used by two, three, and four or more 
farms were evaluated, and the combined risk 
for a “random” truck, for which the number 
of farms previously visited on that day was 
unknown, was estimated. In addition, the 
production type of the initially infected 
farm visited by the truck was included in 
these scenarios. Similarly, for scenarios with 
cleaning and disinfection protocols, the 
probability that a random truck would still 
remain contaminated ater visiting any of 
the three production farm types, and would 
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5BCMF Scenarios created to evaluate the probability that a truck will be contaminated with porcine reproductive and respira-
tory syndrome virus at the end of a working day
/BNFPGTDFOBSJP 5SVDLVTFECZGBSNT 5SVDLXBTIFEEJTJOGFDUFEESJFE 5SVDLVTFECZ
2 fa
2
No
Farrowing
2 nu Nursery
2 i Finishing
3 fa
3
Farrowing
3 nu Nursery
3 i Finishing
4 fa
4 
Farrowing
4 nu Nursery
4 i Finishing
fa
Combined
Farrowing
nu Nursery
i Finishing
fa w
Wash only
Farrowing
nu w Nursery
i w Finishing
fa wd
Wash, disinfect
Farrowing
nu wd Nursery
i wd Finishing
fa wdd
Wash, disinfect, dry
Farrowing
nu wdd Nursery
i wdd Finishing
 W = truck washed; wd = truck washed and disinfected; wdd = truck washed, disinfected, and dried; fa = truck used by farrowing farms;  
nu = truck used by nursery farms; and i = truck used by inishing farms.
have been cleaned by one of the three clean-
ing protocols, was estimated. 
Stochastic model
To quantify the probability that a truck used 
by a number of farms on a given day would 
be contaminated with PRRS virus at the end 
of the day, a stochastic model was developed 
(code attached in supplementary material) 
in OpenBUGS 3.2.2.34 A total of 150,000 
iterations, with a burn-in period of 30,000, 
were obtained ater initializing the model 
with three chains. he convergence, diag-
nostic analyses, and summary of all posterior 
distributions were computed in R using 
the CODA package.35 he convergence of 
the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
model was assessed both visually, using the 
history and autocorrelation plots, and for-
mally, using the Brooks-Gelman-Rubin diag-
nostic,36 which provided an estimate of the 
shrinkage or scale reduction factor for each 
of the nodes and scenarios. he distribu-
tion of the scale reduction factors (median 
and 97.5% upper bounds) was plotted to 
visually assess convergence. Once the model 
converged, the efective sample size was esti-
mated by running the model for a suicient 
number of iterations such that the MCMC 
error became less than 5% of the posterior 
standard deviation for monitored nodes. he 
median and 95% credible interval (CrI) are 
reported, along with the mean and standard 
deviations for the scenarios described above, 
and for each stochastic node.
Sensitivity analysis
A sensitivity analysis was performed for one 
scenario (i), where the truck was used by 
an unknown number of farms and carried 
inishing pigs, without the application of 
any cleaning and disinfection measures. he 
aim was to evaluate and identify possible 
scenarios that could lead to a signiicant 
decrease or increase in the inal probability. 
he percentage change in the mean prob-
ability of contamination was compared to 
the original scenario. hese changes were 
assessed using farm-level prevalence (F prev) 
values for PRRS of 10%, 30%, and 70%; 
animal-level prevalence (A prev) values of 
10%, 30%, 50%, and 100%; and animal-
shedding prevalence (Shed ani) of 10%, 
30%, 50%, and 90%. he sensitivity of the 
model was also evaluated by changing the 
minimum number of infectious animals re-
quired to contaminate a truck (N ani) from 
two to four and eight.
Results
he median probabilities (and 95th percen-
tile of the distribution) of a truck remaining 
contaminated with PRRS virus at the end 
of Day 1 for scenarios with and without the 
application of various cleaning and disinfec-
tion measures are presented in Figure 2. he 
median and 95% CrI, along with mean and 
standard deviation for all the parameters 
used in the model and for all the scenarios, 
are summarised in the supplementary mate-
rial, Table S1. he median probability that 
a truck would be contaminated with PRRS 
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virus at the end of Day 1, when it was used 
by three farms or more, was 1 irrespective of 
the production type of the farm that used 
that truck.  However, the median probabil-
ity for trucks used by only two farms was 0. 
In the case of a “random” truck (ie, one for 
which the number of times it had been used 
for transportation during the irst day was 
not speciied), the median probability was 
0.529 when the source of infection was a 
inishing farm. he median probability of a 
truck remaining contaminated did not difer 
much for truck use across the three diferent 
production types for these scenarios.
When decay of the virus over time was 
incorporated in the model, the outputs 
suggested that the median probability that 
a truck would still remain contaminated 
ater 15 or 30 hours of use during warmer 
months, from a contamination acquired 
on Day 1 and without visiting any other 
infectious farms on subsequent days, was 
not much diferent from the probability on 
Day 1 (Table 3). he median probability de-
creased by 0.049 and 0.051 (approximately 
10%) in the 15 hours of truck use subsequent 
to Day 1, when the truck had been used by 
either a nursery or a inishing farm, respec-
tively, and by 0.063 (12.5%) when it had been 
used by a farrowing farm, compared to Day 1. 
For the next 30 hours ater Day 1, the median 
probability of contamination decreased by 
0.218 for nursery farms and by 0.211 for 
inishing farms, compared to Day 1. Similarly, 
median probability for truck contamination 
ater 30 hours of truck use reduced to 0 when 
the source of infection was a farrowing farm. 
For colder months, the virus can remain vi-
able for approximately 112 hours,37 so once 
contaminated on Day 1, the trucks were 
expected to remain contaminated for approxi-
mately 5 additional days.
With respect to the three cleaning protocols 
evaluated in this study, washing alone reduced 
the median probability of a truck remaining 
contaminated by 0.011 (for example, the prob-
ability for i = 0.525 decreased to 0.514 with 
washing), while washing with disinfection 
decreased the median probability by 0.346 
(approximately 66%). However, washing and 
disinfection followed by overnight drying had 
by far the highest impact, lowering the medi-
an probability of contamination by more than 
99%, to approximately 0.002, irrespective of 
the production type for which the truck had 
been used (Table S2 of supplementary materi-
al). he distributions of probabilities associat-
ed with a truck remaining contaminated ater 
the application of each of the three cleaning 
and disinfection protocols, for the scenario 
involving inishing farms, are presented in 
Figure 3. Similar distributions for scenarios 
without cleaning and disinfection protocols 
could not be obtained due to the parametriz-
ing of nodes used in those scenarios with step 
function, which did not allow for the propa-
gation of uncertainty across these nodes or for 
the scenarios evaluated. However, we would 
expect those scenarios to have similar distri-
butions to that of the “i w” scenario.
Finally, outputs from the sensitivity analy-
ses suggested that the highest percentage 
changes (100% decrease for each scenario 
evaluated) were observed for large decreases 
in farm-level or animal-level prevalence of 
PRRS virus and for a large decrease in the 
probability of shedding animals in the ship-
ment (when either one of these was decreased 
to 10%). However, only a small increase or 
decrease in the median probabilities was 
observed for a smaller increase or decrease in 
each of the parameters evaluated (farm-level 
prevalence, animal-level prevalence, and the 
probability of shedding animals in any par-
ticular shipment (Figure 4 and supplementary 
material, Table S2.) Similarly, large increases 
(2× and 4×) in the minimum number of in-
fectious animals (Nani) required to contami-
nate the truck with PRRS virus resulted in 
only a small decrease (approximately 10% and 
40%, respectively) in the median probability 
of contamination.
he MCMC error was less than 5% of the 
posterior standard deviation for all of the 
reported scenarios and nodes, which sug-
gested that the model had been run for a 
suicient number of iterations, and 40,000 
iterations with a burn-in period of 10,000 for 
each chain was suicient to allow the models 
to converge with a suicient sample size for 
posterior inference. he scale-reduction factor 
was less than 1.05 for all nodes and scenarios 
evaluated, indicating that the model con-
verged. he shrinkage plots, showing the 
evolution of the scale reduction factor with 
an increase in the number of iterations, also 
suggest that the MCMC models converged 
ater approximately an initial 4000 itera-
tions, following the burn-in period of 10,000 
iterations, for most nodes.
'JHVSF Median probabilities (with 95th percentiles, p95) for contamination of 
trucks with porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRS virus) at the 
end of Day 1, for several scenarios, depending on the number of times the trucks 
were shared (three, four, or more) and the production type of the PRRS-virus-infect-
ed farm, (let) without cleaning and disinfection of trucks and (right) with application 
of one of the three cleaning protocols evaluated in the study. Only representative 
scenarios are presented (supplementary material is available [Table S1] for median 
probabilities for other scenarios). Fi = inishing farm; w = washing; wd = washing and 
disinfecting; wdd = washing, disinfecting, and drying.
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5BCMF Probability that a truck will remain contaminated with porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus in  
subsequent time periods during warmer months
/PEFTTDFOBSJPT .FBOQSPCBCJMJUZ
PO%BZ
.FBOQSPCBCJMJUZ
GPSOFYUIPVST
B hFS%BZ
EFDSFBTFJO
NFBOQSPCBCJMJUZ
GSPN%BZ
.FBOQSPCBCJMJUZ
GPSOFYUIPVST
B hFS%BZ
EFDSFBTFJO
NFBOQSPCBCJMJUZ
GSPN%BZ
fa 0.508 0.445 12.40 0.000 100
nu 0.517 0.468 9.48 0.299 42.17
i 0.525 0.474 9.71 0.314 40.19
Fa = truck used by farrowing farms; nu = truck used by nursery farms; and i = truck used by inishing farms.
 
ever, most trucks that are contaminated on 
Day 1 will remain contaminated for at least 
30 hours. Again, this inding was associated 
with shipment size, as most of the trucks, 
due to large shipment sizes, qualiied to have 
infectious and shedding animals suicient 
to maintain the contamination for the next 
few days. In colder months, when the virus 
can survive much longer,37 a truck will tend 
to remain contaminated for approximately 
5 days once contaminated. Cleaning and 
disinfection of trucks to eliminate PRRS 
virus is crucial during winter months,22,39 
when the virus exhibits increased survival. 
However, our study suggests that cleaning 
and disinfection should not be ignored dur-
ing the warmer months, as the likelihood 
that trucks will remain contaminated for a 
number of days following shipment from an 
infected farm is substantial.
In the present study, the viral load on trucks 
could not be quantiied because data on the 
amount of PRRS virus that is typically shed 
were not available. Instead, trucks were clas-
siied in terms of whether they were likely 
to have suicient viral load to be able to 
transmit the infection, on the basis of work 
by Dee et al,4 using shipment size as a proxy 
for viral load. Shipment size was linked to 
PRRS viral load on the trucks in terms of a 
dose-response relationship, which further 
afected the time that the truck would likely 
remain infected with the virus. Even with 
decay of the virus over time, trucks that carry 
larger shipments from infected farms can 
remain contaminated for several subsequent 
days and have suicient viral loads to infect 
susceptible animals. 
he sensitivity analysis attempted to identify 
the most inluential parameters on the prob-
ability of truck contamination, particularly 
parameters whose values had been estimated 
on the basis of the experts’ input. However, 
the outputs suggested that small incremen-
tal changes in the farm-level prevalence of 
Discussion
his analysis evaluated the risk for contami-
nation with PRRS virus of trucks involved 
in the transportation of pigs. To do so, a 
baseline model was irst developed to assess 
the likelihood that trucks used for ship-
ment of pigs will become contaminated 
with PRRS virus and remain so at the end of 
Day 1. he model was extended to explore 
a number of possible scenarios, including 
variations in the number of times a truck 
was used in a day, the farm- and animal-level 
prevalence of PRRS virus, the size of the 
shipment on a truck, the probability of shed-
ding animals in the shipment, and the period 
of travel involved. he model was extended 
to quantify the probability that the truck 
would remain contaminated on subsequent 
days once it became contaminated, without 
visiting any other infected farms, by includ-
ing decay of the virus over time in the model. 
We also attempted to evaluate the eicacy of 
commonly-used cleaning and disinfection 
protocols in eliminating this virus from con-
taminated trucks.
On the basis of this model, the estimated 
probability of a truck being contaminated 
at the end of a day increased substantially 
with an increase in the number of visits the 
truck made on a given day. However, there 
were no major diferences in the probabili-
ties for scenarios when the truck was used 
by farrowing, nursery, or inishing farms. 
he two parameters that were diferent 
in the model among the three produc-
tion types were shedding percentage and 
shipment size. he sensitivity analysis sug-
gested that the model was less inluenced 
by changes in shedding percentage, unless 
it was a very large change, and that above 
a certain threshold for this parameter, the 
model behaved similarly. his explains why 
very limited diferences in risk were ob-
served among the three production types. 
While separate shipment size distributions 
were speciied for the three production 
types, in most cases the shipment size was 
very large, typically large enough to have 
the minimum number of animals required 
to characterize the trucks as being contami-
nated. hus, this parameter also had little 
impact in terms of overall diferential risk 
among the three production types.
he model suggested that the virus would be 
eliminated from only a very small propor-
tion of trucks by simply washing the vehicle, 
while washing followed by disinfection 
should clean the virus from just over half of 
the trucks. Washing and disinfection, fol-
lowed by overnight drying, had the highest 
impact, resulting in the removal of PRRS 
virus from a large majority of contaminated 
trucks. One possible explanation for the 
high eicacy of this protocol may be as fol-
lows. Washing alone can reduce the amount 
of debris and organic matter but cannot 
eliminate the virus, while washing followed 
by disinfection can be useful when the sur-
faces are free of organic matter. However, the 
addition of drying can eliminate the virus 
from contaminated surfaces by eliminating 
the residual virus that persists ater washing 
and disinfection has occurred.38 Findings 
from our study are in slight contrast with 
those observed in the experimental stud-
ies.5,24 In the experimental study, washing 
had no efect at all, and washing and dis-
infection were efective in approximately a 
quarter of replications, while washing, disin-
fection, and drying resulted in the elimina-
tion of the virus in all replications. he dif-
ferences observed in the current study were 
likely due to the introduction of uncertainty 
and stochasticity into the model.
Finally, the model suggested that, during 
warmer months, a slight decrease may oc-
cur in the probability that the trucks will be 
contaminated on the following day, as some 
trucks may become decontaminated the fol-
lowing day simply due to viral decay. How-
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PRRS virus, in the animal-level prevalence of 
the virus, and in the percentage of shedding 
animals in the shipment, did not greatly af-
fect the model outcome (median probability 
of truck contamination). he sensitivity 
analysis indicated that either decreasing the 
farm-level prevalence of the virus to 10% 
(from 50%) by participating in area regional 
control programs, or decreasing the animal-
level prevalence of the virus to a similar level 
by adopting a number of PRRS elimination 
programs such as herd closure, all in-all out 
animal low, and avoiding direct or indirect 
contacts between subpopulations within 
a farm, could decrease the probability for 
truck contamination by more than half. 
hese two indings may have practical sig-
niicance in controlling the spread of PRRS 
virus via shared transport.
Despite several simplifying assumptions, we 
believe the model has captured the underlying 
pathways leading to the contamination with 
PRRS virus of trucks used in the transporta-
tion of pigs on Canadian farms, from which 
infection can be transmitted to susceptible 
pigs. However, for some scenarios, only point 
estimates are presented for the probability of 
truck contamination, as the model could not 
produce uncertainties around these estimates 
due to the use of a step function in the model, 
which is a limitation of the model. Due to 
the lack of available data, the current model 
did not include pathways leading to eventual 
transfer of infection from such trucks to 
susceptible pigs or naive farms. However, the 
model could be further extended to elucidate 
such probabilities, as well as to estimate the 
indirect-contact transmission probability of 
spreading the PRRS virus via the sharing of 
trucks. A similar approach could be utilized 
in understanding the risk of truck sharing 
on the spread of other swine diseases where 
transportation has been implicated as a me-
dium for viral spread, as appears to be the case 
for porcine epidemic diarrhea.21
Findings from this study have value to the 
Canadian swine industry in helping produc-
ers make informed decisions regarding the 
sharing of trucks among farms and guiding 
their selection of cleaning protocols for 
trucks. Given the current truck-sharing pat-
terns among Canadian swine farms, where, 
for more than half of the shipments on any 
given day, the same truck has been used on 
more than one farm,18 together with cur-
rent biosecurity practices for truck cleaning 
in Canada, where only approximately one 
third of the trucks used for the shipment of 
pigs are cleaned ater every shipment,40 the 
current model suggests that there is a sub-
'JHVSF Distribution of posterior probabilities for the contamination of trucks with 
porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus ater application of one of the 
three diferent cleaning and disinfection protocols (w = washing; wd = washing and 
disinfection; and wdd = washing, disinfection, and drying), for a truck that was used by 
an infected inishing (i) farm. Boxes represent inter quartile range of the distribution.
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'JHVSF Risk plot showing sensitivity of the median probability that a truck 
will be infected with porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus to 
changes in key model parameter values from those of the baseline model (1344): 
N ani (minimum number of infectious animals required to contaminate the truck), 
farm-level prevalence (F prev), animal-level prevalence (A prev) of the virus, and 
the probability of shedding animals (Shed ani) on the truck, respectively. Only 
representative sensitivity analysis scenarios are presented (supplementary material 
is available [Table S2] for median probabilities for other scenarios).
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stantial risk for spread of PRRS virus through 
contaminated trucks. his risk could be 
largely eliminated either by properly washing, 
disinfecting, and drying trucks between ship-
ments, by substantially decreasing the farm- 
or animal-level prevalence of the PRRS virus, 
or by using designated trucks for each farm in 
an attempt to minimize sharing among farms. 
Planning shipments so that farms of similar 
PRRS status are visited in sequence (on the 
assumption that the PRRS virus status of 
each farm is known), or using dirty trucks for 
the transportation of market pigs and clean 
trucks for shipping gilts and young pigs to 
farms, may be strategies that minimize the 
transmission of PRRS virus via shared trans-
portation. Cost is a major determinant for 
regular cleaning and disinfection of shipment 
trucks, so future studies to evaluate the cost 
and beneit of proper cleaning and disinfec-
tion of trucks should aid swine producers and 
transporters in making informed decisions.
Implications
r 'JOEJOHTGSPNUIJTTUVEy suggest that 
under current biosecurity practices, a 
substantial risk exists for the spread of 
PRRS virus due to truck sharing.
r 1SPQFSMZXBTIJOHEJTJOGFDUJOHBOE
drying trucks between shipments could 
largely eliminate this risk.
r 	?JTNPEFMDPVMEBMTPCFVUJMJ[FEJO
understanding the risk of truck sharing 
on the spread of other swine diseases, 
such as porcine epidemic diarrhea.
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Conversion tables
8FJHIUTBOENFBTVSFTDPOWFSTJPOT
$PNNPO	64
 .FUSJD 5PDPOWFSU .VMUJQMZCZ
1 oz 28.35 g oz to g 28.4
1 lb (16 oz) 453.59 g lb to kg 0.45
2.2 lb 1 kg kg to lb 2.2
1 in 2.54 cm in to cm 2.54
0.39 in 1 cm cm to in 0.39
1 t (12 in) 0.31 m t to m 0.3
3.28 t 1 m m to t 3.28
1 mi 1.6 km mi to km 1.6
0.62 mi 1 km km to mi 0.62
1 in2 6.45 cm2 in2 to cm2 6.45
0.16 in2 1 cm2 cm2 to in2 0.16
1 t2 0.09 m2 t2 to m2 0.09
10.76 t2 1 m2 m2 to t2 10.8
1 t3 0.03 m3 t3 to m3 0.03
35.3 t3 1 m3 m3 to t3 35
1 gal (128 l oz) 3.8 L gal to L 3.8
0.264 gal 1 L L to gal 0.26
1 qt (32 l oz) 946.36 mL qt to L 0.95
33.815 l oz 1 L L to qt 1.1
Temperature equivalents (approx)
°F   °C
32 0
50 10
60 15.5
61 16
65 18.3
70 21.1
75 23.8
80 26.6
82 28
85 29.4
90 32.2
102 38.8
103 39.4
104 40.0
105 40.5
106 41.1
212 100
˚F = (˚C × 9/5) + 32
˚C = (˚F - 32) × 5/9
1 tonne = 1000 kg 
1 ppm = 0.0001% = 1 mg/kg = 1 g/tonne 
1 ppm = 1 mg/L
Conversion chart, kg to lb (approx)
Pig size Lb Kg
Birth 3.3-4.4 1.5-2.0
Weaning 7.7 3.5
11 5
22 10
Nursery 33 15
44 20
55 25
66 30
Grower 99 45
110 50
132 60
Finisher 198 90
220 100
231 105
242 110
253 115
Sow 300 135
661 300
Boar 794 360
800 363
Modelling contamination of trucks used in the 
shipment of pigs infected with porcine reproductive 
and respiratory syndrome virus
Krishna K hakur*, Crawford W. Revie*, Daniel Hurnik*, Javier Sanchez*; thakurvet@gmail.com 
* Department of Health Management, Atlantic Veterinary College, University of Prince Edward Island, Charlottetown, PEI, Canada
Data Description (Estimation 
of values/parameters)
Truck use 
he proportion of trucks used (Tr.usei) for 
two, three and four or more “j” farm visits 
on a given day and the proportion of trucks 
with more than the minimum number of 
shipped animals  (Minani ) for each of three 
“k” production types were obtained from 
the pilot pig traceability data.
Shipment size and travel time
he number of infectious animals in a given 
shipment, and the travel time were estimated 
as described below:
Prevalence of shedding animals on 
a truck
he prevalence of shedding animals (Shed.
prev.k) was adjusted by the within-farm 
prevalence of PRRS (A.Prev.k).  Expert 
judgement suggested that the proportion of 
animals shedding the virus (Shed.anim.k) 
varied according to the growth stage of the 
pigs being transported and it was suggested 
that 20%, 50% and 70% of weaned piglets, 
nursery pigs, and inishing pigs, respectively, 
would typically be shedding the virus. How-
ever, in doing so, we might have underesti-
mated the risk by not accounting for those 
animals there were not seropositive yet but 
were still shedding the virus.
Several studies have reported very high 
within-farm prevalence of PRRS virus rang-
ing from 80 -100% (Dee and Joo, 1994; 
Maes, 1997; Nodelijk et al., 2003). For this 
study, we used an animal-level prevalence 
(A.Prev.k) of 80% and evaluated the impact 
of this variable on the model outcome by 
carrying out sensitivity analysis. 
Minimum number of shedding 
animals in a shipment
PRRS virus is excreted through urine, faeces 
and oral luids of infected animals in addition 
to several other bodily secretions (Wills et 
al., 1997c; Bierk et al., 2001), though the 
dynamics of these shedding patterns is not 
well documented. herefore, it was di cult 
to quantify the amount of PRRS virus likely 
to be present on any given shipment truck. 
We were interested in estimating the infec-
tious potential of the trucks such that the 
virus could be transmitted to naive animals. 
We therefore assessed whether or not the 
trucks would likely have suicient viral load 
to infect susceptible pigs. Dee and colleagues 
(2004b) demonstrated that the presence of 
two infectious pigs on a truck trailer for two 
hours was suicient to transmit the virus to 
naive pigs on the subsequent introduction 
of these animals to the truck. Using these 
guidelines as a cut-of value, we categorized 
trucks as having suicient infectious virus 
or not to transmit PRRS virus to naïve pigs 
(i.e. they must have transported at least two 
infectious animals and have had a travel time 
of at least two hours).
Minimum number of animals 
(Minani.k) on a truck to have at 
least two infectious animals 
We used the hypergeometric distribution to 
estimate the minimum number of shedding 
animals needed in a shipment (Minani.k) 
for each production type, in order to have 
two infectious animals (Nani) on a truck 
that were shedding the virus. We used 95th 
percentile of shipment size (Shipsize.k), as 
recorded in the pilot pig traceability data, 
for each of the three production types as ‘N’, 
and the number of shedding animals, which 
was based on Shed.prev.k, as the ‘m’ param-
eter of the hypergeometric process. For psi, 
we used one, as the odds of drawing a shed-
ding animal from the shipment was similar 
to that of drawing an animal that was not 
shedding the virus. Psi is the odds of drawing 
shedding vs not shedding animal from the 
sample using hypergeometric distribution.
Shipment size (Shipsize) and Mini-
mum shipment size (Minship.k )
he shipment size was simulated as a tri-
angular distribution with 5th and 95th 
percentile of the shipment size recoded in 
the pilot pig traceability dataset for each of 
the three production types as minimum and 
maximum of the distribution. Based on this 
distribution for shipment size, the probabil-
ity that a truck had minimum shipment size 
(Minship.k ) or more animals than Minani.k 
was estimated using the step function avail-
able in OpenBUGS. 
Infective Dose (Inf.dose)
Finally, we estimated the probability that a 
truck has an infective dose of PRRS virus 
(Inf.dose) if it shipped at least Minani and 
had a travel time (Travel) of at least two 
hours.
Additionally, since the infectious dose is 
related to the environmental conditions, 
we calculated the infective dose (Inf.dose) 
for warm and cold seasons. PRRS virus has 
been described as having  a median infec-
tious half-life of 14.6 hours (95% CI = 12.6 
- 17.2) in pig manure at an ambient tem-
perature of 220°C (Linhares et al., 2012). 
he PRRS virus has a comparatively longer 
half-life of 112.6 hours (95% CI = 103.2 
- 123.8) in pig manure at an ambient tem-
perature of 40°C (Linhares et al., 2012). We 
were guided by this information to extend 
the model to incorporate viral decay in order 
to quantify the risk that trucks would still 
be contaminated with PRRS virus on subse-
quent days in either warm and cold months.
For warmer months, we assumed that at least 
one infectious dose of virus would be present 
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on trucks that have at least two infectious 
animals, that had been kept on the truck for 
at least two hours. So, based on viral decay 
with an assumed half-life of 15 hours, for at 
least one infectious dose of virus to be pres-
ent during the 15 hours subsequent to the 
truck being used on Day 1, would require 
that at least four infectious animals (this is 
analogous to having two infectious doses of 
virus on Day 1) were present on the truck, 
and similarly for the truck to be infectious for 
the next 30 hours that at least eight infectious 
animals would need to have been present. 
On the other hand, for colder months we 
assumed that trucks with at least two infected 
animals could be considered to be infective 
for around ive days, as the half-life of the 
virus is much longer (112.6 hrs at 40°C), 
and thus we did not attempt to quantify the 
likelihood for time points beyond a one 
week duration from which the truck initially 
became infected. 
Travel time 
In order to estimate the amount of virus shed 
during transportation, the travel time was 
irst estimated and then the probability that a 
given shipment was longer than two or more 
hours was computed. It was assumed that the 
most likely travel time in Ontario, Canada 
was around two hours, which corresponds 
to the travel time estimated by Dee et al. 
(2004b) for swine operations in Minnesota 
and was likely to vary between a minimum 
of half an hour and a maximum of six hours. 
We used this information to parameterise 
a triangular (min, max) distribution in 
OpenBUGS. First, two similar uniform 
distributions were computed for travel time 
(min/2, max/2) and these distributions were 
summed together that yielded a triangular 
distribution.  hese equations provided a 
travel time distribution with mean and me-
dian of 3.25 hours.
he probability that a given shipment lasted 
for at least two hours was estimated using 
the step function to the distribution of travel 
time. he step function provided the prob-
ability of travel time equal to 1 if the travel 
time was more than two hours. 
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Table S1: Summary posterior distribution of nodes and scenarios used in the Bayesian model simulated to evaluate the prob-
ability that a truck will be contaminated with PRRS virus at the end of a working day.
Nodes Median 95% CrI* Mean SD!
F.pos.2 1 0-2 0.994 0.71
F.pos.3 2 0-3 1.50 0.87
F.pos.4 2 0-4 2.00 1.0
F.inf.2 1 0-1 0.753 0.43
F.inf.3 1 0-1 0.873 0.33
F.inf.4 1 0-1 0.938 0.24
Comb.prob 1 0-1 0.831 0.25
Minani.Fa 16 4-39 17.00 8.94
Minani.Nu 6 2-15 6.50 3.35
Minani.Fi 4 2-9 4.31 2.00
Minship.Fa 1 0-1 0.678 0.47
Minship.Nu 1 0-1 0.701 0.45
Minship.Fi 1 1-1 0.711 0.46
Nani.Fa1 2 0-8 2.7 2.09
Nani.Nu1 2 0-7 2.58 1.81
Nani.Fi1 2 0-6 2.42 1.51
Nani.Fa1.step 1 0-1 0.688 0.46
Nani.Nu1.step 1 0-1 0.702 0.46
Nani.Fi1.step 1 0-1 0.711 0.45
Travel.time 3.25 1.13-5.39 3.25 1.12
Travel 1 0-1 0..851 0.355
W.eicacy 0.010 0.005-0.115 0.024 0.032
Wd.eicacy 0.588 0.308-0.831 0.590 0.14
Wdd.eicacy 0.978 0.782-1 0.955 0.06
Scenarios Median 95% CrI* Mean SD!
2.fa 0 0-1 0.429 0.49
2.nu 0 0-1 0.445 0.50
2.i 0 0-1 0.450 0.50
3.fa 1 0-1 0.505 0.5
3.nu 1 0-1 0.524 0.49
3.i 1 0-1 0.531 0.49
4.fa 1 0-1 0.540 0.4
4.nu 1 0-1 0.560 0.50
4.i 1 0-1 0.568 0.50
 
Table S1 continued on page 4
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Table S1 continued: Summary posterior distribution of nodes and scenarios used in the Bayesian model simulated to evaluate 
the probability that a truck will be contaminated with PRRS virus at the end of a working day.
Scenarios Median 95% CrI* Mean SD!
fa 0.499 0-1 0.482 0.45
nu 0.522 0-1 0.490 0.45
i 0.529 0-1 0.501 0.45
fa.w 0.486 0-0.996 0.471 0.44
nu.w 0.511 0-0.996 0.488 0.44
i.w 0.517 0-0.996 0.495 0.44
fa.wd 0.164 0-0.636 0.197 0.21
nu.wd 0.181 0-0.639 0.205 0.21
i.wd 0.185 0-0.643 0.207 0.21
fa.wdd 0.001 0-0.159 0.022 0.05
nu.wdd 0.001 0-0.159 0.023 0.05
i.wdd 0.001 0-0.160 0.023 0.05
* 95% credible Interval  
! Standard deviation
Table S2: Sensitivity analysis for the probability that a truck used by swine farms will be contaminated with PRRS virus at the 
end of a working day.
Scenarios Notations
Parameter ±% change  
in input  
parameter
Median 
probability
±% change 
in median 
probabilityNani F. Prev A.Prev Shed.ani
i 1344 2 50 80 70 NA 0.517 Baseline  
scenario
Change in Nani to 4 2344 4 50 80 70 100% 0.474 -9.71
Change in Nani to 8 3344 8 50 80 70 200% 0.318 -39.43
Change in farm level prevalence to 10% 1144 2 10 80 70 -80 0.000 -100.00
Change in farm level prevalence to 30% 1244 2 30 80 70 -40 0.311 -40.76
Change in farm level prevalence to 70% 1444 2 70 80 70 40 1.0 90.48
Change in animal level prevalence to 10% 1314 2 50 10 70 -87.5 0.000 -100.00
Change in animal level prevalence to 30% 1324 2 50 30 70 -62.5 0.458 -12.76
Change in animal level prevalence to 50% 1334 2 50 50 70 -37.5 0.515 -1.90
Change in animal level prevalence to 100% 1354 2 50 100 70 25 0.551 4.95
Change in shedding animal (Shed.ani)   
to 10%
1341 2 50 80 10 -85.7 0.000 -100.00
Change in  shedding animal (Shed.ani)   
to 30%
1342 2 50 80 30 -57 0.485 -7.62
Change in  shedding animal (Shed.ani)  
to 50%
1343 2 50 80 50 -28.6 0.516 -1.71
Change in  shedding animal (Shed.ani)   
to 90%
1345 2 50 80 90 28.6 0.555 5.71
 
#CODES FOR THE MODEL
#A. Codes for OpenBugs
Model  {
tr.use[1:3] ~dmulti(p.truse[], 100) 
p.truse[1:3]~ddirch(alpha[]) 
for(k in 1:3){ alpha[k]<-1}
#Truck used by 
#tr.use2 ~ dbin(p.truse2, n) 
#tr.use3 ~ dbin(p.truse3, n) 
#tr.use4 ~ dbin(p.truse4, n)
#P that atleast one farm is infected 
farm.pos2 ~ dbin(farm.prev, 2) 
F.inf.2<- step(farm.pos2-0.5)
farm.pos3 ~ dbin(farm.prev, 3) 
F.inf.3<- step(farm.pos3-0.5)
farm.pos4 ~ dbin(farm.prev, 4) 
F.inf.4<- step(farm.pos4-0.5)
comb.prob <-F.inf.2*p.truse[1]+F.inf.3*p.truse[2]+F.inf.4*p.
truse[3]
#P that the truck has more than Minimum infected animals
Nani.fa~dhyper(Minani.fa, m.fa, N.fa, 1) 
n1.fa~dunif(1,50)  
Minani.fa<-round(n1.fa) 
shipsize.fa1~dunif(5, 175) 
shipsize.fa2~dunif(5, 175) 
shipsize.fa<-(shipsize.fa1+shipsize.fa2)
Nani.fa1~dhyper(Minani.fa,m.fa, N.fa, 1)  
Nani.fa1.step<- step(Nani.fa1-2)
Minship.Fa <- step(shipsize.fa-Minani.fa)*Nani.fa1.step
Nani.nu~dhyper(Minani.nu, m.nu, N.nu, 1) 
n1.nu~dunif(1,30)  
Minani.nu<-round(n1.nu) 
shipsize.nu1~dunif(6, 350) 
shipsize.nu2~dunif(6, 350) 
shipsize.nu<-(shipsize.nu1+shipsize.nu2)
Nani.nu1~dhyper(Minani.nu,m.nu, N.nu, 1) 
Nani.nu1.step<- step(Nani.nu1-2)
Minship.Nu <- step(shipsize.nu-Minani.nu)*Nani.nu1.step 
Nani.i~dhyper(Minani.i, m.i, N.i, 1) 
n1.i~dunif(1,20)  
Minani.i<-round(n1.i) 
shipsize.i1~dunif(3, 150) 
shipsize.i2~dunif(3, 150) 
shipsize.i<-(shipsize.i1+shipsize.i2)
Nani.i1~dhyper(Minani.i,m.i, N.i, 1)  
Nani.i1.step<- step(Nani.i1-2)
Minship.Fi <- step(shipsize.i-Minani.i)*Nani.i1.step
#P that the travel time was more than two hours 
travel.time1~dunif(0.25, 3) 
travel.time2~dunif(0.25, 3) 
travel.time<-(travel.time1+travel.time2)
##travel.time~dbeta(alpha.t, beta.t) 
#mean<-(min.t+lambda*mode.t+max.t)/(lambda+2) 
#alpha.t<-(mean-min.t)*(2*mode.t-min.t-max.t)/((mode.t-      
    mean)*(max.t-min.t)) 
#beta.t<-(alpha.t*(max.t-mean))/(mean-min.t) 
#lambda~dgamma(alpha1, beta1)
#travel.time ~ dnorm(mean, prec)C(0,) 
#mean <-(0.5+4*2+6)/6 
#sd<-(6-0.5)/6 
#prec<-1/pow(sd, 2) 
Travel <- step(travel.time-2) 
#Evaluation of cleaning and disinfection protocols
#Truck_wash_protection node 
N.W.Prot ~ dbin(W.eicacy, N.W)
#Tr_washndisinfection_protection node 
N.Wd.Prot ~ dbin(Wd.eicacy, N.Wd)
#Tr_washndisinfectionndry_protection node 
N.Wdd.Prot ~ dbin(Wdd.eicacy, N.Wdd)
# Prior distribns for eicacy - 50% 
W.eicacy ~ dbeta(0.5,0.5) 
Wd.eicacy ~ dbeta(0.5,0.5) 
Wdd.eicacy ~ dbeta(0.5,0.5)
#p.truse2 ~ dbeta(0.5,0.5) 
#p.truse3 ~ dbeta(0.5,0.5) 
#p.truse4 ~ dbeta(0.5,0.5)
#Prior for travel time 
#alpha1<-0.0001 
#beta1<-0.0001
#Scenarios 
#Scenarios without cleaning 
S.2.fa <- F.inf.2*Minship.Fa*Travel  
S.2.nu <- F.inf.2*Minship.Nu*Travel  
S.2.i <- F.inf.2*Minship.Fi*Travel  
S.3.fa<- F.inf.3*Minship.Fa*Travel  
S.3.nu <- F.inf.3*Minship.Nu*Travel  
S.3.i<- F.inf.3*Minship.Fi*Travel  
S.4.fa <- F.inf.4*Minship.Fa*Travel  
S.4.nu <- F.inf.4*Minship.Nu*Travel  
S.4.i <- F.inf.4*Minship.Fi*Travel  
S.fa <- comb.prob*Minship.Fa*Travel  
S.nu <- comb.prob*Minship.Nu*Travel  
S.i <- comb.prob*Minship.Fi*Travel 
#Scenarios with cleaning 
S.fa.w <- (1-W.eicacy)*comb.prob*Minship.Fa*Travel  
S.fa.wd <- (1-Wd.eicacy)*comb.prob*Minship.Fa*Travel  
S.fa.wdd <- (1-Wdd.eicacy)*comb.prob*Minship.Fa*Travel  
S.nu.w <- (1-W.eicacy)*comb.prob*Minship.Nu*Travel  
S.nu.wd <- (1-Wd.eicacy)*comb.prob*Minship.Nu*Travel  
S.nu.wdd <- (1-Wdd.eicacy)*comb.prob*Minship.Nu*Travel  
S.i.w <- (1-W.eicacy)*comb.prob*Minship.Fi*Travel  
S.i.wd <- (1-Wd.eicacy)*comb.prob*Minship.Fi*Travel  
S.i.wdd <- (1-Wdd.eicacy)*comb.prob*Minship.Fi*Travel  
}
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#B.  Codes for R for combined outputs and for running the   
    CODA package 
#Truck risk Model
library(R2OpenBUGS)
setwd(“C:\\Users\\Risk_paper”)
#Data 
#Truck used by 
tr.use= c(49, 19, 32)
#travel time
N.W.Prot=0 
N.W=20 
N.Wd.Prot=6 
N.Wd=10 
N.Wdd.Prot=10 
N.Wdd=10 
Nani.fa=2 
Nani.nu=2 
Nani.i=2
#Now these parameters can easily be changed for the sensitivity  
     analysis 
farm.prev=0.5
shed.prop.fa=0.2 
shed.prop.nu=0.5 
shed.prop.i=0.7
ani.prev=1
N.fa=351 
m.fa=round(ani.prev*shed.prop.fa*N.fa); m.fa
N.nu=700 
m.nu=round(ani.prev*shed.prop.nu*N.nu); m.nu
N.i=250 
m.i=round(ani.prev*shed.prop.i*N.i); m.i
data.b <- c(“tr.use”, “N.W.Prot”, “N.W”, “N.Wd”, “N.Wd.Prot”,           
”N.Wdd.Prot”, “N.Wdd”, “Nani.fa”, “Nani.nu”, “Nani.i”, “m.fa”,  “N.fa”,
            “m.nu”, “N.nu”, “m.i”, “N.i”, “farm.prev” )
par.b <- c(“farm.pos2”, “farm.pos3”, “farm.pos4”, “comb.prob”,   
   “Minani.fa”,
           “Minani.nu”, “Minani.i”, “Minship.Fa”, “Minship.Nu”,   
   “Minship.Fi”,
           “Nani.fa1”, “Nani.nu1”, “Nani.i1”, “Nani.fa1.step”,  
   “Nannu1.step”, “Nani.i1.step”,
           “travel.time”, “Travel”, “W.eicacy”, “Wd.eicacy”,  
   “Wdd.eicacy”, 
           #Scenarios
           “S.2.fa”, “S.2.nu”, “S.2.i”, “S.3.fa”, “S.3.nu”, “S.3.i”, “S.4.fa”, 
           “S.4.nu”, “S.4.i”, “S.fa”, “S.nu”, “S.i”,  
           #Scenarios with cleaning
           “S.fa.w”, “S.fa.wd”, “S.fa.wdd”, “S.nu.w”, “S.nu.wd”,  
               “S.nu.wdd”,  
           “S.i.w” , “S.i.wd”, “S.i.wdd” 
) 
#par.c<-c(“S.4.i”)
inits.2<- list(list( W.eicacy=0, Wd.eicacy=1, Wdd.eicacy=0.1), 
#shipsize.fa=5,
               list( W.eicacy=0.05, Wd.eicacy=0.5, Wdd.eicacy=1),  
 #shipsize.fa=50,
               list( W.eicacy=1, Wd.eicacy=0.5, Wdd.eicacy=0.1))   
 #shipsize.fa=100,
tr.risk <- bugs(data.b, inits=inits.2 , parameters=par.b,  
   “Risk_model_openbugs_May19.txt”, 
                n.chains = 3, n.burnin=10000, n.iter = 50000, n.thin=1,   
codaPkg=F,
                working.directory = getwd(), clearWD=F, debug=F,   
 DIC=F)
print(tr.risk, digits=4)
#analysis convergence 
library(coda) 
tr.out=as.mcmc.list(tr.risk) 
codamenu() 
2 
tr.out 
#ater this need to use interactive coda menu 
gelman.plot(tr.out, bin.width = 10, max.bins = 50)
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